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Financing the Small Firm Start-Up:
Determinants of Debt Use
Frederick C. Scherr
Timothy F. Sugrue
Janice B. M^rd

While academic research concerning capital structure of large corporations has
been abundant in the finance literature, studies of small firms have been some
what less common, and investigation of capital structure at origin (start-up) has
been virtually nil. In this paper we present empirical evidence concerning the
start-up capital structures of small firms. We base this investigation upon char
acteristics of both owner and firm. We find the percent o f the owner's income
expected to be derived from the business to be positively associated with debt
use and the owner's age to be negatively associated with debt use. We find that
more debt is obtained if the business owner is married and less if he or she is
black. Similarly, more debt is prevalent among start-up firms in transportation
and utilities than those in other industries. When debt obtained from other than
financial institutions is considered, factors such as gender, experience, educa
tion, and expected firm size also play a role in the structure o f start-up capital.

I. INTRODUCTION

While the theoretical and empirical study of the capital structures of large
firms has a long history, the capital structure decisions of small firms have
received a good deal less attention. Pettit and Singer [31] suggest that the
capital structure of the small firm is determined in part by the interaction
of the owner's risk-return preferences, the characteristics of the firm, and
the costs of various types of financing. They see agency problems and a high
level of asymmetric information as major determinants of financing costs.
This paper presents an empirical investigation of the initial (start-up)
capital structures of small firms. Section II discusses the owner's risk-return
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preferences, the costs of various types of financing, and the business's char
acteristics as determinants of these capital structures. Section III reviews
prior empirical studies in the area. Section IV presents our research hypoth
eses and methodology. Section V presents our empirical results. Section VI
summarizes our findings and suggests areas for future research.
II. DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
FOR SMALL FIRMS
The Owner's Risk-Return Preferences

Owners of small businesses can, to some extent, implement their own
risk-return preferences in choosing the firm's capital structure. Whereas the
small business literature frequently characterizes small business owners as
being less risk averse than others [31], there may be portfolio consider
ations which encourage them to be more risk averse.^ Specifically, the busi
ness usually comprises a relatively large fraction of the owner's wealth so
that the owner is under-diversified, forcing relatively conservative decisions
in asset selection and financial structure [3]. The net effects of risk aversion
and diversification will, in part, determine the owner's preference with
regard to financial and operating risk.
The Costs of Financing

There are several reasons why suppliers of capital may require higher
returns from smaller firms. First, small firms may in fact be more risky than
larger firms. There are several reasons for this. The small firm's owner/man
ager may be less risk-averse than managers of larger firms, and conse
quently may select more risky projects [31]. Also, the owner/manager is
generally a specialist in one facet of the firm (often its products or services),
with less interest and ability in other critical areas. Finally, small firms, par
ticularly those in high-technology product lines, deal in a limited number
of new products or services for which there may be no accepted market
niche.
Second, even if a small firm's actual risk is the same as that of a larger
firm, suppliers of capital may demand higher required returns because of
the higher estimation risk in forecasting expected return and risk. The
value of the human capital (a critical determinant of small business success)
is not easily observed, particularly for the first-time business owner [20,
31].^ Further, audited reports and data from commercial reporting agencies
on smaller firms are frequently unavailable or limited.
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Finally, there is substantial reason to believe that agency problems
between suppliers of outside capital and the owner/manager are greater for
small than for large firms. In general, small firms have more flexibility in
altering their financial and operating structures and are more difficult to
monitor [31]. Also, as majority owners, owner/managers face greater incen
tives to alter the structure of the firm in favor of themselves at the expense
of outside suppliers of capital. Suppliers of outside capital must build all of
these factors into their required returns.^
The Firm's Business Characteristics

As for large firms, the characteristics of the small firm's business line
and its asset structure will, in part, determine capital structure. For exam
ple, firms with more securable assets and firms with lower investment in
research and development will be able to obtain debt on more favorable
terms, resulting in a tendency to use more debt [37].
III. PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF SMALL FIRMS’
CAPITAL STRUCTURES

Relatively little research has been done on the capital structures of small
firms, particularly in a multivariate context. Most such research has concen
trated on the characteristics of the small firm itself. Leeth and Scott [23]
investigated the use of secured borrowing. Using data from two samples of
loans to small business, they found that the use of secured debt is associated
with the age of the firm (their proxy for default probability), loan size, loan
maturity, legal environment, economic conditions, and industry.^ Walker
[40] generally found support for hypotheses relating firm characteristics to
capital structure, but his small sample size (13 firms) precludes robust con
clusions. Ou [29] divided his sample of small businesses into three catego
ries: very small firms, traditional small businesses, and dynamic ventures.
He found that financing differed among the categories.
Recent studies by Bates [7] and by Ando [2] incorporated not only
characteristics of the firm but also characteristics of the owner Using a sam
ple taken from the Characteristics of Business Owners database. Bates
examined the dollar amount of debt financing used by small business own
ers. He found that the owner's education, age, the dollar amount of equity
capital, and whether the business was ongoing or a start-up affected dollar
debt financing for whites. For blacks, education, the amount of equity cap
ital, the owner's experience in a family-owned business, and whether the
business was ongoing or a start-up affected dollar debt financing. He also
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found that blacks used less dollar debt than whites with the same qualifica
tions (either because they chose to use less debt or because of credit discrim
ination).
Using a sample of about 500 owners of established businesses in 1984,
Ando performed regression analysis to test determinants of capital struc
ture. At the 90% confidence level, she found the following to influence debt/
equity position significantly for established small businesses: the owner's
business education, the age of the firm, the firm's size, the firm's growth
rate, the firm's credit rating, the firm's initial debt position, and whether the
firm had obtained an SBA loan.
With respect to ethnicity, Ando found that minority m en who are
American Indians, Eskimos, and Asian Indians (persons from India and
Pakistan) used less debt, as did Asian women. Not found to affect debt posi
tion were the amount of initial equity capital, minority status, and gender
except as discussed above.
Bates' and Ando's studies are strong initial efforts in linking both busi
ness and personal characteristics to debt/equity mix. Our study advances
their research in several respects. First, like Ando, we concentrate on finan
cial leverage (debt/equity mix), but we employ much larger samples than
she did. Second, we control for the effects of industry, an important busi
ness characteristic which has been found to be a significant factor affecting
capital structure for large firms. Finally, we investigate in far more detail the
relationship between the owner/manager's human capital and the firm's
capital structure.
IV. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
Research Hypotheses

In studies of the capital structures of large firms, the dependent vari
able usually studied is the ratio of debt to total capitalization (or its equiva
lent, debt/equity). This ratio is important for two reasons. First, debt/equity
position represents an important choice in that it has substantial implica
tions for the firm's level of risk and return. Second, while subject to con
straints and costs imposed by the market, the firm has a reasonably wide
choice of its debt/equity position; therefore, its debt/equity choice is impor
tant evidence regarding the incentives to which the firm's m anagers
respond.
Our research hypotheses concern the relationship between the ratio of
debt to total capitalization and three sets of explanatory variables:
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1. variables which enable lenders to value the firm's human capital;
2. variables which represent the owner/manager's risk preferences and/
or credit discrimination by lenders; and
3. variables which capture the firm's business and operating
attributes.
Our hypotheses regarding the first two of these sets of variables are
based on Myers' Pecking Order Hypothesis [25] (referred to hereafter as the
POH), a theory of capital structure choice with important application to
small firms.^ In this view, firms finance their needs in hierarchical fashion,
first using internal equity, followed by debt, and finally external equity. This
ordering is caused by the effects of asymmetric information and agency
problems on the returns required by providers of various sources of funds
[19, 26]. For small businesses, asymmetry of information and agency prob
lems between management and outside investors are more acute than for
laige firms, making differences in costs between internal equity, debt, and
external equity consequently greater Therefore, the hierarchical approach
should have even more appeal to small firms than to large.
If Myers' POH holds for small firms, external equity will be extremely
costly, and debt financing will be much preferred as a method of obtaining
external funds. Given that the owner/manager's equity contribution is lim
ited by his or her personal net worth, capital structure will depend to some
extent on the amount of borrowing which lenders will grant on reasonable
terms. This lending, in turn, will depend in part on how they value the firm's
human capital, as this is a major determinant of the small firm's success.
Lenders will provide capital at lower required returns to firms where
the perceived value of the owner's human capital is higher Consequently,
variables which reveal the value of the owner's human capital should be
determinants of capital structure. Values for these variables which indicate
a greater potential for success should lead to more debt as a proportion of
initial capital since, under the POH, debt is preferred for outside financing.
In addition to measures of the value of the firm's human capital, the
owner/manager's personal characteristics (such as the amount of the man
ager's other income, his or her gender, ethnicity, etc.) may influence capital
structure choice. This influence may occur in two ways. First, personal char
acteristics may affect the owner/manager's risk preferences and therefore
the amount of debt he or she is willing to incur. Second, personal charac
teristics of the loan applicant may influence the amount and/or cost of
funds borrowed via gender or racial discrimination in lending.
Our final set of explanatory variables concerns the firm's business and
operating attributes. There is substantial evidence in the large-firm litera
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ture that certain of these attributes, such as the available of securable assets,
lead to greater debt use.
Sample

Our sample has been extracted from the 1982 Characteristics of Busi
ness Owners (CBO) database. This is a stratified sample of 125,000 small
business owners collected in 1986 and reflective of business status as of
1982 [38].^ The following firms were excluded from our sample:
a. Firms reporting no equity capitalization. There must be some equity capi
talization to start a business. Removing these firms from the sample
provides a reasonability check on the financial data reported by the
firm.
b. Firms whose owner is not the original founder. This cutout centers around
data reliability. We wanted data to be as reliable as possible, and sus
pect that founders are more likely to have accurate information on
the business's start-up capitalization than are subsequent owners.
c. Firms with yearly sales below $5,000. This cutout is to purge the data of
firms which are so small that serious consideration of funding has
probably not been undertaken.
d. Firms founded before 1980. Given that the CBO questionnaire was
administered in 1986, it seems reasonable to include only recentlyfounded businesses, as these probably have the most reliable start-up
data. To a great extent, this restriction also holds constant interest
rates and tax regimes.
Multiple-owner firms were randomly assigned to one of the owners
and that owner's personal characteristics were used to characterize the
firm's ownership; other owners of the same business are excluded from the
sample. (There are several possible approaches to the problem of multiple
owners when there may be differences in race, gender, education, etc., but
this approach seemed least likely to induce systematic bias.)
One important question in investigating the small firm's capital struc
ture concerns the treatment of debt obtained from insiders (the owner, the
owner's family and friends, etc.). Ang [3] refers to such debt as “quasi
equity,” stating that for such borrowings, the legal rights of debt will not be
enforced (also see Ou [30] for discussion of this issue). To address this prob
lem, two subsamples were developed; one containing all firms, regardless
of the source of debt financing, and one where all the firms' borrowings
were solely from financial institutions.^ These cutouts and other data
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requirements resulted in sample sizes of 41,665 for the first subsample and
7,588 for the second.
Measurement Issues

Data Encoding—The Characteristics of Business Owners (CBO) data
base is based on responses to a questionnaire. Our statistical analysis related
a measure of debt/equity from this questionnaire to explanatory variables
measuring the value of human capital, personal characteristics, and the
firm's business/operating attributes. The CBO questionnaire required
responses of three types: numerical responses, multiple-choice responses
am ong alternative ranges of a num erical variable, and categorical
responses. Responses of the first two types were treated as if data were con
tinuous: for numerical responses, the actual numerical response was used,
and for multiple-choice responses, the midpoint of each numerical range
was used. (While a set of dummy variables could have been used to repre
sent the later data, utilizing a single variable based on the midpoint of the
range simplified estimation and interpretation.) For categorical data,
dummy variables were used with a one indicating membership in the cate
gory.
Dependent Variable—Our dependent variable was the ratio of business
start-up debt to total capital. Responses to a multiple-choice question with
eleven ranges of debt to total capitalization (i.e, none, 1-10%, 11-20%, etc.)
were encoded based on the midpoints of these ranges. Therefore, this vari
able can take on eleven values.
Measures of Human Capital—^The following variables were used to mea
sure the value of the owner's human capital:
a.

Owner's Age. Lenders may be willing to lend to older, more experi
enced owner/managers at startup since there is likely to be less uncer
tainty about their performance. Responses to a multi-choice question
with six ranges of the owner's age were encoded based on the mid
points of these ranges.®
b. Owner's Education. If education contributes to success in small busi
ness, lenders should be willing to lend more to better educated
owner/managers.® This continuous variable was measured as total
years of education.
c. Owner’s Business Education. Ando found that this type of education
was associated with greater debt. A dummy variable captured
whether the owner had formal business education.
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d. Owner’s Family Business Experience. Coming from a family with small
business experience may aid in small business success and increase
loan availability. A dummy variable captured whether the owner's
family had owned a small business.
e. Owner's Managerial Experience. Like other types of education and
experience, managerial experience may cause lenders to place a
higher value on the firm's hum an capital. Responses to a m ulti
choice question with seven ranges of years of managerial experience
were encoded based on the midpoints of these ranges.
f. Owner's Business Ownership Experience. Owner/managers who have
previously owned a small business have, via the performance of this
prior business, revealed a good deal about their competence. A
dummy captured whether the owner had prior business ownership
experience.
Measures of Other Personal Characteristics—Our second set of explana
tory variables is intended to capture differences among owners due to these
factors:
a. Percent of Owner's Income Expected from the Business. The higher the
percent of income that the owner expects to derive from the small
business, the lower is the diversification of the owner/manager's
income stream, and the less debt is likely to be used (since the owner
will be more risk averse due to this lack of diversification; see Ang
[3]). However, there is a counterhypothesis: banks may prefer to lend
when the firm is expected to provide a larger share of the owner's
income, since the owner is more likely to concentrate on the affairs
of the firm. To proxy for the fraction of income expected (at startup)
to be derived from the business, we use the actual percent of income
which the owner derived from the business, measured after the fact.
Responses to a multiple-choice question with seven ranges of actual
percent of income from the business were encoded based on the mid
points of these ranges.
b. Owner's Marital Status. Married owners are more likely to have a sep
arate income stream from their spouse, resulting in more financial
diversification. Therefore, m arried owners are likely to use more
debt.^^ A counterhypothesis is that married owners, because they
may have two income streams, will have higher net worths and thus
(under the POH) will substitute cheaper internal equity for debt. A
set of three dummy variables captured whether the owner was mar
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ried, divorced or separated, or a widow or widower. Never married
was the excluded category.
c. Owner's Gender. Research conducted prior to the 1960s found differ
ences in risk preference between males and females with females
being more risk averse. However, more recent investigations includ
ing studies using entrepreneurs as subjects [24] have found no such
difference. Nonetheless, credit discrimination based on gender may
exist, reducing the availability of borrowed funds to women. A vari
able captured male/female. (One equals male.)
d. Owner's Ethnicity. Little research had been done on differences in risktaking propensity by ethnicity; any such differences may influence
the owner/manager's choice of capital structure. There also may also
be credit discrimination based on ethnicity, and empirical evidence
indicates that such discrimination in lending amounts and lending
costs exists either because of owner's ethnicity or business location in
a minority area [5, 12, 18]. This discrimination is primarily directed
against black businesses and tends to decrease their debt ratios. How
ever, the conventional wisdom is that minority firms may also have
relatively little initial equity contribution because earnings and, con
sequently, savings from the owner/manager are less than for owner/
managers of nonminority firms. This would tend to increase the debt
ratio. We address these issues by employing measures of Hispanic/
nonhispanic and black/nonblack ethnicity. Two dummy variables
captured Hispanic/nonhispanic and black/nonblack ethnicity. White
was the excluded category.
Business and Operating Characteristics of the Firm—^The following vari
ables were employed to capture these effects:
a. Industry. In prior empirical research on large firms, industry mem
bership has been associated with capital structure choice [10, 35, 37].
Industry membership can proxy for a number of factors, including
the securability of assets. To a great extent, industry membership
captures business characteristics, a factor which Pettit and Singer cite
as important in small-firm capital structure. A set of nine dummy
variables captured m em bership in ten industry groups. T he
excluded category was Agricultural Services.
b. Expected Size. For larger firms, more information is available, and
they may obtain financing in markets which are foreclosed to or
extremely costly for smaller firms. Firm size has been used in several
studies of capital structure [9, 30, 37] to capture these effects of mar-
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ket a c c e s s . A s in our proxy representing the percent of income
expected to be derived from the business, we use actual size to proxy
for expected size. Responses to a multiple-choice question with 10
ranges of actual dollar sales were encoded based on the midpoints of
these ranges.
c. Expected Profitability. Profitability has been used in prior studies of
existing large and small firms and generally has been found to be
negatively associated with debt use.^^ However, the usual test relates
past profits to present capital structure, the premise being that firms
have used accumulated profits in place of debt financing. Our
study concerns start-up capital structures; there are no accumulated
profits to supplant debt. In such a situation, if there is a pecking
order making debt more expensive than internal equity, firms will
only use debt financing if there is sufficient expected profitability to
warrant the costlier funds; hence profits and start-up debt should be
positively related. Our measure of expected profitability is actual net
income before taxes divided by actual total capitalization. Both are
measured as the midpoints of response ranges to multiple-choice
questions (16 ranges for net income, nine ranges for total capitaliza
tion).
It is important to note that for the percent of income expected to be
derived from the business, expected sales, and expected profitability, we
have used actiial outcomes to proxy for expectations at the time of startup;
there are no expectational measures on the CBO database. Such a proce
dure introduces an element of measurement error since actual outcomes
may differ from the expectations under which startup capital structure
plans were made. However, we felt these variables to be of sufficient impor
tance to make this tradeoff advantageous.^^
V.

RESULTS

Sources of Debt

Readers may be interested in the sources of debt used by the firms in
the CBO database. Of the firms in this database, the majority used only the
owner's savings as initial capital [29]. For those firms who employed debt
capital financing, many utilized multiple sources of borrowing; the largest
single source of debt was the firm's bank, with borrowing from other mem
bers of the family (“quasi-equity”) being the second most important source.
A summary of sources of debt for firms in the CBO cl3.t3.l33.sc IS prescnteci in
Table
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Table 1
Percents of Debt Borrowed from Various
Sources for Firms in the CBO Database
that UtiHzed Debt Financing at Start-Up
Borrowing Sources
Family

Friends

Government

White— Males

23.7%

6.7%

White— Females

27.6%

Hispanic

Owner’s Ethnicity

Seller

Bank

1.6%

7.7%

60.3%

6.6%

1.7%

7.2%

56.9%

30.4%

11.0%

3.0%

7.7%

47.8%

Black

22.8%

11.4%

5.5%

4.6%

Other Minority

30.3%

16.8%

2.1%

12.5%

Notes:

38.3%

Abstracted from Ou [29], Table 6.

All Firms

We related the explanatory variables to debt/capitalization via OLS
regression. Because data on our dependent variable are categorical (11
levels), we also considered two alternative methodologies: Tobit and Pro
bit. While Tobit has been applied in situations w^here the dependent vari
able is lim ited, Kmenta [21] and Amemiya [1] have argued that this
method is most advantageous when values of the dependent variable out
side a specific range are omitted or lost. Perhaps a more appropriate alter
native for the situation at hand is ordered Probit analysis, recently
demonstrated in a financial context by Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay [17].
This computationally intensive technique entails the joint estimation of
multiple Probit models. Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay contrast estimates
from this technique with those from OLS. They find that discreteness of
the dependent variable does matter in that the standard errors of OLS
estimates are generally larger, leading to fewer significant results. We
chose OLS over Probit primarily for simplicity in computation and inter
pretation, accepting more-conservative hypothesis tests as a penalty for
these advantages.
OLS results for the first subsample, which includes firms regardless of
their source of borrowing, are presented in Table 2.
We expected that lenders would be more willing to lend to older
business owners because they would have less uncertainty regarding the
owner's competence. However, while owner's age is statistically significant,
its estimated coefficient has an unexpected sign; it is negatively related to
debt position. There are several possible explanations for this result:
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Table 2
Results of Analysis via OLS Regression;
Dependent Variable is Debt/Total Capitalization
(Includes All Firms Regardless of Source of Debt)
Explanatory Variable
Intercept

Estimated
Coefficient

t Statistic

0.1931

12.312***

Group 1: Variables Measuring Owner's Education or Experience
Age
Years of Education
Business Education
Business Ownership Experience
Managerial Experience
Family Business Experience

-0.0017
-0.0017
0.0019
0.0260
0.0001
0.0163

-10.936***
-2.855**
0.512
5.955***
0.448
3.424***

Group 2: Variables Measuring Risk Preference or Discrimination
Percent o f Income Expected from Business

0.1201

28.858***

Marital Status (excluded class: Never Married)
Married
Divorced or Separated
WidowAVidower

0.0601
0.0378
0.0432

9.238***
4.433***
3.222**

0.0357

9.281***

-0.0041
-0.0323

-0.958
-6.849***

Gender (Male = 1, Female = 0)
Ethnicity
Hispanic
Black

Group 3: Variables Representing Business and Operating Attributes
Industry Dummy Variables
(excluded group: Agricultural Services)
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, Utilities
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Other Services
All Other
Expected Sales Size
Expected Profitability
Notes:

-0.0055
-0.0836
-0.0321
0.1354
-0.0193
0.0138
-0.0646
0.0012
-0.0324
3.287x10'®
0.1078

-0.300
-7.133***
-2.690**
11.097***
-1.292
1.339
-5.376***
0.194
-2.788**
8.480***
12.229***

The sample size is 41,665. The adjusted
is .0512. F for this equation is 94.774,
which is significant at the 0.0001 level. An *, **, or *** next to a / statistic indicates that
the estimated coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001
levels respectively.
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1. Older owners may have larger net worths, and may substitute this
internal equity for debt financing (the POH); there is no measure of
the owner's net worth on the CBO database to control for this effect.
2. Older owners may be more risk averse since their investment time
horizon is shorter
3. Lenders may be reluctant to lend to older people, despite informa
tional advantages, because of their shorter expected time of owner
ship.
4. The measure of age we used may not be the proper operationaliza
tion to capture the relationship.
The variables which measure other aspects of experience or education
present a mixed picture. Estimated coefficients for business ownership
experience and family business experience are statistically significant and
have the expected sign, but the coefficient for years of education is signifi
cant and unexpectedly signed. Business education and management expe
rience are not statistically significant. This is contrary to Ando's [2] result for
established small businesses; she found that owners with business education
had significantly more debt in their firms' capital structures. While lenders
may consider education in lending to established business but not to star
tups, it is also possible that our measures simply do not capture the dimen
sions of education and experience which are considered by lenders in
making such decisions. Multicollinearity among the education and experi
ence variables may also play a part.
Coefficients for variables portraying risk preference and/or credit dis
crimination tell a different story. We find a very strong positive association
between the expected percent of income derived from the firm and the pro
portion of debt financing. This finding supports the idea that lenders favor
firms which are expected to be the primary sources of income for their own
ers, and thus probably their main occupations. The proportion of debt used
is significantly higher for married owners than for never-marrieds. This
result is consistent with prior empirical work [39] and with the hypothesis
that lenders favor owners with diversified sources of income. Interestingly,
we also find that significantly more debt is used by divorced or separated
owners and by widows and widowers than by those owners who have never
been married. This may indicate that lenders discriminate against the
never-married. It is not due to differences in age since age is among the
variables controlled in our research design.
We find that male owners utilize significantly more debt than female
owners. There are at least two possible explanations for this result. Female
owners may be more risk averse, and therefore choose to employ less finan-
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cial leverage in the capital structures of their firms. The other possibility is
that there may be discrimination in lending against female owners relative
to otherwise-equivalent male owners. Lending discrimination would result
in lower levels of debt in females' capital structures by either limiting the
amount of debt financing available or making debt a less attractive financ
ing alternative due to higher cost. A similar result occurs for black versus
white owners (black owners use less debt than white owners), perhaps for
the same reasons. There is no difference in debt use between Hispanic ver
sus white owners. These results for ethnicity and gender contrast with
Ando's research, which in general did not find ethnicity or gender to be
important capital structure determinants, but are in keeping with other
empirical research [5, 7, 12, 18, 39].
Similar to Leeth and Scott's [23] results regarding secured lending to
small firms and results in the large-firm literature, we find industry to be an
important factor in debt position. Of the nine industry dummies, the esti
mated coefficients of five are statistically significant relative to the excluded
group (Agricultural Services). By far the highest proportion of debt occurs
for firms in the “Transportation and Utilities” category which includes
trucking, taxi, and similar companies with highly securable assets (vehi
cles). Small firms in the construction, manufacturing, finance, and “other”
groups had significantly lower startup financial leverage than the excluded
group.
A nother factor which affects startup leverage in this sam ple is
expected size (as measured by actual sales). Firms that are expected to be
larger are able to raise significantly more debt as a proportion of total fund
ing than are smaller firms. The positive relationship between debt position
and firm size is in line with Ando's results.
Likewise, expected profitability is a powerful influence on debt posi
tion. Firms which are expected to have greater debt-servicing capacity uti
lize higher volumes of debt at startup either because they have more
profitable projects available and borrow to finance these projects or because
lenders will lend to them on more advantageous terms.
Firms Borrowing Only From Financial Institutions

These results are presented in Table 3. Differences between results for
this sample and the first may illustrate differences in lending criteria
employed by all lenders (including those providing quasi-equity) versus the
criteria employed by financial institutions alone. An alternative explanation
is that owners who borrow from insiders are in some ways different from
those who borrow from financial institutions.
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Table 3
Results of Analysis via OLS Regression:
Dependent Variable is Debt/Total Capitalization
(Includes Firms which Borrow Only from Financial Institutions)
Estimated
Coefficient

t Statistic

0.6702

20.306***

-0.0031
-0.0006
-0.0020
0.0032
-0.0003
-0.0183

-9.032***
-0.476
-0.253
0.362
-0.726
-1.847

Percent o f Income Expected from Business

0.0320

3.630***

Marital Status (excluded class: Never Married)
Married
Divorced or Separated
Widow/Mdower

0.0353
0.0268
0.0401

2.149*
1.287
1.275

Explanatory Variable
Intercept
Group 1: Variables Measuring Owner's Education or Experience
Age
Years of Education
Business Education
Business Ownership Experience
Managerial Experience
Family Business Experience
Group 2: \hriables Measuring Risk Preference or Discrimination

Gender (Male = I, Female = 0)

-0.0038

-0.450

Ethnicity
Hispanic
Black

0.0033
-0.0343

0.368
-3.366***

Group 3: Variables Representing Business and Operating Attributes
Industry Dummy Variables
(excluded group: Agricultural Services)
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, Utilities
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Other Services
All Other
Expected Sales Size
Expected Profitability
Notes:

0.0634
-0.0100
0.0158
0.0885
0.0194
0.0505
0.0268
0.0732
0.0396
1.508x10'^
0.2692

1.865
-0.429
0.651
4.032***
0.615
2.507*
1.063
3.679***
1.691
0.128
9.802***

The sample size is 7,588. The adjusted F? is 0.0336. Ffor this equation is 12.007,
which is significant at the 0.0001 level. An *, **, or *** next to a <-statistic indicates that
the estimated coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001
levels respectively.
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We find far fewer statistically significant associations than for the prior
sample. Age is again significant but again has an unexpected negative sign.
Unlike the prior sample, none of the coefficients for education or experi
ence variables are significant. Among the risk preference/discrimination
variables, expected percent of income from the business is again significant
and positively signed. In this regression, marrieds have higher startup debt
than never marrieds but divorced or separated and widows and widowers
do not. There is no difference betvveen the startup debt/equity positions of
firms owned by males and females. However, blacks still use significantly
less debt at startup than do whites.
Among the industry classifications, transportation and utilities, retail
ers, and other services now have significantly different debt ratios than the
excluded group; the later two groups were not significantly different from
the excluded group in the prior sample. In this sample, higher expected
sales volumes are not associated with more debt. However, as before, firms
with higher expected profitability employ more debt at startup.
VI. SUMMARY AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

What characteristics of the firm and its owner/manager influence its startup
capital structure? Age appears to be negatively associated with debt use,
regardless of the source of borrowing. We do not find consistent support for
the owner's other educational and experience-based characteristics as
determ inants of startup financial leverage, though some appear to be
important to insider lenders (but not to financial institutions). However, we
do find substantial support for the percent of income expected firom the
business, marital status, and ethnicity as factors affecting start-up capital
structure for all types of lenders. The significance of these characteristics
could arise from differences in owner's risk preference, differences in the
owner's net worth, or discrimination in credit markets. We also find that sev
eral business and operating characteristics of the firm are im portant in
obtaining initial debt financing. Firms in the transportation and utility
industry category and firms with higher expected profits utilize more debt.
There is much left to do. While our tests of hypotheses produce several
strongly significant results, our model explains only five or three percent
(depending on the sample) of the cross-sectional variation in startup capital
structure. Idiosyncratic factors in the lender's decision regarding small
business loan appUcations (such as the lender's assessment of the quality of
the apphcant's business plan) limit the ability of any model to capture small
firms' startup debt positions. However, there are undoubtedly important
factors which influence initial debt/capitalization and which we have not
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included in our model because proxies are not available in the CBO data
base. Chief among these is the owner's net worth which is the dominant
variable in determining the initial equity investment according to the Peck
ing Order Hypothesis. Investigation of these and other factors are areas for
future research.
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NOTES
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

Empirical comparisons o f risk aversion between small business owners and other
groups have produced mixed results. See, for example, Brockhaus [11] and Sexton and
Kent [34].
Indeed, the value o f his or her own human capital may not even be known by the
business owner; see Bates [6].
Instead o f paying these higher required returns, the small firm may agree to conditions
o f investment or borrowing which tend to ameliorate these agency problems such as
stringent restrictions on managerial decisions or secured borrowing [23, 31]. However,
these conditions impose other costs on the firm.
Other less recent studies o f secured borrowing include Glassman and Struck [16] and
the National Federation of Independent Business [27].
For other approaches to modeling the capital structure choice o f the small firm, see
Evans and Jovanovic [14] and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson [15].
The advantage o f this database is its huge size. The major disadvantage is cost. This
database is not publicly accessible. To use it, the researcher enters into a contract with
the Bureau o f Census and pays for access; our costs were several hundred dollars for
each statistical procedure performed. These costs severely limit exploratory data
analysis, prelim inary checking o f variable correlations and distributions, and
experimentation with variable encodings and functional forms.
This procedure follows Bates [6, 7].
The age variable on the CBO database is the owner's age as o f December 31, 1982.
Combined with the criteria that firms must have been started during 1980-1982 to be
included in the sample, this creates a small measurement error in the owner's age at
start-up for some firms. For firms started in 1982, the reported age is correct, but the
reported age is one year (on average) too high for businesses started in 1981 and two
years two high for businesses started in 1980. The importance of this measurement
error should be considered in light of the values o f the age variable itself which range
from 20 to 70.
See Bates [6] for discussion of the relationship between bank lending and education.
Bates finds a positive relationship between owner education and small business
longevity
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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
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Partial support for this hypothesis comes from prior research on sources o f start-up
capitalization which indicated that married women utihze substantially more bank debt
in their start-up capital structure than do unmarried women [39].
Many female small business owners believe that they are discriminated against by
lending institutions [8, 33, 42]. Such discrimination may explain the prior empirical
result that, in general, women employ slightly less bank borrowing as a proportion of
their start-up capital structure [39].
It should be noted that this conventional view is not supported by recent empirical
research [18], which did not find such differences in the net worths between black and
white business owners at startup.
For discussion of changes in types o f financing in the context o f a growing firm, see
Walker [41]. Also, as the firm grows, changes in m anagerial behavior, including
increased risk aversion, may occur [36], which also influence capital structure choice.
See Baskin [4] for a literature review; this is evidence in support o f the POH. In
addition to these tests o f association, survey evidence in support o f the POH has been
found in the capital structure policies employed by managers o f large (Pinegar and
Wilbricht [32]) and small (Norton [28]) firms.
See Krishnan, Ramanujam, and Rao [22] for discussion o f this point.
In a recent paper, Keasey and McGuiness [20] discuss this argument in detail and find
empirical evidence that small start-up firms require greater returns firom initial debt
financing than from internal equity financing. As an alternative explanation for their
empirical results, they postulate that banks may lend only to firms whose potential
profitability is greater.
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for comments which lead to our clarification
of this issue.
See Ou [29] and Bates [7] for additional discussion o f sources o f debt financing for
firms in the CBO database.
These R^s are somewhat lower than those o f other researchers. Ando's regression
explaining debt/equity for ongoing firms has an R^ o f 0.31 [2, pp. 88-89]. However, by
far the largest contribution to the equation's explanatory power comes from the firm's
debt ratio at startup, a variable not appropriate when investigating start-up capital
structure as we do. Elliehausen and Wolken [13], using two samples extracted fi-om the
National Survey of Small Business Finances, get R^s o f 0.15 and 0.05 for equations
similar to ours.
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